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Wright Line: The NLRB Adopts the Mt.
Healthy Test for Dual Motive Discharge
Cases Under the LMRA

In Wright Line,' the National Labor Relations Board (Board) abandoned its standard causation test for mixed motive or dual motive discharge cases arising under sections 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act' (Act) and adopted in its stead the test enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School DistrictBoard of Education v. Doyle." In so doing, the Board wrote an elaborate opinion explaining the development of the conflicting tests applied by the Board
and the federal courts of appeals, the Mt. Healthy test, and the applicability of that test to section 8(a)(3) cases.
Wright Line presented an ideal opportunity to introduce a new causation analysis for dual motive discharge cases in the labor context.4 The
1.

251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (Aug. 27, 1980). The case is also reported in

DALy LAB. REP. No. 178 (BNA) (Sept. 11, 1980) and reviewed in 49 U.S.L.W. 2204 (Sept.

23, 1980).
2. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976)). The Act amended the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) and provides, in relevant part:
§ 7. [29 U.S.C. § 157] Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...
§ 8. [29 U.S.C. § 158](a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section (7] ...
(2)...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....

§9...
§ 10. [29 U.S.C. § 160](c).

. . No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or
the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
3. 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (unanimous opinion). Mt. Healthy, although factually similar to §
8(a)(3) cases, was decided on first amendment grounds and therefore is not binding on the
Board.
4. All facts are from the Wright Line opinion, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175-76.
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General Counsel alleged that Wright Line had violated sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging Bernard Lamoureux because of his
protected union activities. Wright Line denied this allegation and asserted that Lamoureux had been legitimately discharged for violating a
plant rule against "knowingly altering or falsifying production time reports, payroll records, [and] time cards."' The Administrative Law Judge
ruled in Lamoureux's favor. Wright Line excepted and brought the case
before the Board.
In presenting his prima facie case, the General Counsel showed that
Lamoureux had become a leading union advocate in 1976 and had been
active in soliciting support for the union in the 1976 and 1977 election
campaigns. Both sides eniployed aggressive tactics during the campaigns
and the Wright Line management exhibited overt antiunion animus. The
management was particularly hostile toward Lamoureux, whom they considered the "union kingpin." Lamoureux's discharge was effected shortly
after the union lost the second election in 1977.
At the time of his discharge, Lamoureux had been employed by Wright
Line for over ten years and had been an inspector for two years. His employment record during this time was superior. Despite this employment
record, Lamoureux's supervisor was directed by the plant superintendent
the day before the discharge to "check" on him. He found certain discrepancies on Lamoureux's time sheet the next morning and reported
them to the plant superintendent. On request, Lamoureux provided a
reasonable explanation, but, nevertheless, was promptly fired for violating
the plant rule against altering time records.
The General Counsel also showed that other -employees had violated
the rule, but only the most severe violators had been discharged. Two
employees who had deliberately falsified their time cards were only
warned. The evidence established that the discrepancies on Lamoureux's
time sheet had no effect on the production control system and had not
benefitted him financially. Finally, the General Counsel showed that
Lamoureux's final paycheck had been prepared before he had been offered an opportunity to explain the discrepancies. Upon this evidence, the
Board held Wright Line in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
When faced with previous discharge cases in which it appeared that the
employer's reasons for discharging an employee might be both permissible and impermissible, the Board had applied an "in part" causation
test.' Under this test, if the employee's protected union activities were a
5. Id. at 1175.
6. See, Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575, 92 L.R.R.M. 1328,
1330, enforcement denied, 574 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1978).
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factor, however slight, in the employer's discharge decision, the discharge
was held to violate the Act. This harsh result was sometimes mitigated by
requiring the employee to prove that the employer was motivated in
"substantial part" by his protected activities. 7 However, this "substantial
part" test differed very little from the "in part" test in application and
the Board has faced increasing opposition to the tests over the past two
decades.8
While the Supreme Court has stated that decisions by the Board are to
be accorded considerable deference' and has designated the "substantial
evidence test" as the standard for review of Board decisions, 10 the courts
are not required to apply the same causation analysis as the Board. As a
result, only the Sixth, 1 Seventh' and Tenth1 s Circuits have consistently
supported the "in part" test. The others have developed independent,
conflicting tests. These various causation tests and their inconsistent application " have led to what the Board terms "intolerable confusion in the
8(a)(3) area."' 5
The First Circuit was the earliest and most outspoken critic of the "in
part" test, primarily because of the test's inherent partiality toward union
activists." After struggling with the test for years, the court rejected it in
7. See, e.g., Central Casket Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 362, 92 L.R.R.M. 1547, 1548 (1976). See
also cases cited at 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
8. See Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293 (1st Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1315 (lst Cir. 1971).
9. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Driver's Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
10. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The test is "[w]hether on the
record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support [the] agency findings." Id. at 491.
11. The Sixth Circuit has consistently deferred to the Board's causation analysis and has
limited its review to the substantial evidence test. See, e.g., NLRB v. Publishers Printing
Co., 625 F.2d 746, 749 (6th Cir. 1980); Northern Telecom, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 421, 422
(6th Cir. 1980); Hobart Corp. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Youngstown
Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1978); Waltz v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.
1977).
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pfizer, Inc., 629 F.2d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1980); Pelton Casteel,
Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 27 (7th Cir. 1980) (rejecting Mt. Healthy); St. Luke's Mem.
Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 601 (7th
Cir. 1978).
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. First Nat'l Bank, 623 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1980); M.S.P. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 174 (10th Cir. 1977).
14. Although not generally subscribing to the "in part" test, the other circuits have applied it, or a facsimile of it, occasionally. See, e.g., Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565
F.2d 1074, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1977); Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1977); Singer Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d
172, 179 (8th Cir. 1970). See also 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170-72.
15. 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
16. NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publ. Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J., concurring). See also 105 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
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favor of a "dominant motive" test.17 This test requires the employee to
prove that his protected activity was the "dominant" or "primary" reason
for his discharge rather than merely "a factor" or a "substantial factor."'Is
While the First Circuit has moved away from the original format of this
test,"' the Ninth Circuit has generally adhered to it.'0 The Fourth l and
District of Columbia2 Circuits have also applied a "dominant motive"
test, but in a "pretext" format.
This "pretextual approach" is applied by the Third,' 8 Fifth 4 and
Eighth25 Circuits. Under this approach, the employee must first present a
prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. Then the employer must
show that he had legitimate cause for the discharge. In rebuttal, the em17. NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968). The test originated in
NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publ. Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (lst Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J.,concurring).
Cf. NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1953).
18. 320 F.2d at 842. Cf. NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1st Cir. 1971).
19. The court called its approach a "but for" test in Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB,
550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977) citing Mt. Healthy as general support for its stance. The court
also made it abundantly clear to the Board that the "in part" test was unwelcome in the
circuit. Id. at 1293. More recently, the court has adopted the Mt. Healthy test. NLRB v.
Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1979). See note 43 infra, and accompanying text.
20. Stephens Inst. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 720, 726 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358
(1980); Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1978); Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1978).
21. See NLRB v. Burns Motor Freight, Inc., 635 F.2d 312, 314-15 (4th Cir. 1980); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1976). See also, McLean
Trucking Co., v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 1168, 1169-70 (4th Cir. 1980); American Mfg. Assocs. v.
NLRB, 594 F.2d 30, 36 (4th Cir. 1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d
1268, 1273 (4th Cir. 1978).
22. See Midwest Regional Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
23. See Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1980); Stein Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605
F.2d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1979); Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368 (3d
Cir. 1978).
24. See Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1980); Florida Steel Corp.
v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 742-44 (5th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581 F.2d 511, 514-15
(5th Cir. 1978); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry,
J., concurring); and NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956). However, language in other opinions lends doubt as to the approach actually being applied, e.g., NLRB v.
Southern Plasma Corp., 626 F.2d 1287, 1294 (5th Cir. 1980) ("motivating cause" and "but
for"); Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1980) ("moving
cause"); NLRB v. Big Three Indus. Gas & Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979) ("reasonably equal"); NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers,
Inc., 398 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1968) ("moving cause"). See also Brown & Root, Inc. v.
NLRB, 634 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1981).
25. See NLRB v. Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 634 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1980); Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Melrose Processing
Co., 351 F.2d 693, 699 (8th Cir. 1965). See also Zoll v. Eastern Allamakee Community
School Dist., 588 F.2d 246, 251 (8th Cir. 1978).
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ployee must prove that the employer's proffered legitimate reasons are a
mere pretext for the real, discriminatory reason. Support for this test
stems from the nearly analogous Title VII area 6 and generally from dicta
7
in the 1937 Labor Board Cases.'
However, as the Board pointed out in Wright Line, the "pretextual approach" is conceptually incompatible with the "dual motive" situation. 8
The pretext situation exists when an employer has discharged an employee solely in retaliation for his protected activity and has presented a
smokescreen of fictitious legitimate reasons. In the dual motive case, the
employer actually bases his decision on both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons. When multiple reasons exist, it is unrealistic to apply a test requiring the determination of a single, "real" reason.
Whether this problem is one of conflicting fundamental concepts or
simply one of semantics, it is alleviated by the Mt. Healthy test. Under
this test, the distinction between "pretext" and "dual motive" is immaterial.' 9 The test ultimately focuses on the employer's ability to prove that
his legitimate business reasons, standing alone, justify the discharge.
The Mt. Healthy test consists of two distinct parts. First, the employee
must make a prima facie case that he was engaged in protected activity
and that this activity was a "substantial factor" or "motivating factor" in
the employer's decision to terminate his employment. Once this has been
established, the burden shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he would have reached the same decision even
in the absence of the protected activity.30
Mt. Healthy was a dual motive discharge case brought on first amendment grounds.3 ' Doyle, the plaintiff, was an untenured school teacher
whose employment contract was subject to yearly renewal by the board of
education. When he was not rehired, Doyle brought an action in federal
district court claiming that his discharge was in violation of his first
amendment right of free speech. The board contended that the discharge
resulted from several incidents at the school and Doyle's "notable lack of
tact in handling professional matters.""'

26. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804, 807 (1973), and its
progeny, e.g., Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 425
U.S. 405 (1975). But see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
27. See particularly,Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) and NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
28. 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
29. See Id. at 1170 n.4.
30. 429 U.S. at 287; see also 105 L.R.R.M. at 1172-73.
31. All facts are from the Supreme Court's opinion, 429 U.S. at 281-83.
32. Id. at 282-83. In one instance, an argument between Doyle and another teacher led
the other teacher to slap him. Doyle refused to accept an apology and insisted the other
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The controversy centered around one incident in particular: The school
principal had circulated a memorandum regarding teacher dress and appearance and Doyle had reported it to a local radio station. At trial, the
district court held that the telephone call to the radio station was speech
protected by the first amendment. Because the speech played a "substantial part" in the school board's decision, the discharge was held to be
wrongful. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. 3
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. In evaluating the district
court's analysis, the Court explicitly rejected any causation test focused
solely on whether protected conduct had "played a part, 'substantial' or
otherwise"" in the discharge decision, stating that an employee "ought
not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from
assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on
the basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct makes the
employer more certain of the correctness of its decision.""' The Court
stressed that the causation analysis must balance the competing interests
of the employee and employer. "[T]he proper test to apply in the present
context is one which likewise protects against the invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights."" With this foundation, the Court
enunciated the new test with its formal, burden shifting procedure and
directed that it be applied by the district court on remand.7
As justification for adopting this test in Wright Line, the Board found
that both Congress and the Supreme Court had already implicitly sanctioned the burden shifting procedure of the Mt. Healthy test in the context of section 8(a)(3)." In the legislative history, Senator Taft, cofounder of the Act, indicated that the procedure was implicit in the 1947
amendment to section 10(c).39 The Board also noted that the Supreme
Court has already used the procedure in the 8(a)(3) area, although not in

teacher be punished. His persistence prompted the suspension of both teachers, which in
turn led to a walkout by other teachers. Other incidents included an argument with school
cafeteria employees over the amount of spaghetti served to him; reference to students, in
connection with a disciplinary complaint, as "sons of bitches"; and making an obscene gesture to two girls failing to obey his commands as cafeteria supervisor. Id. at 281-82.
33. 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975).
34. 429 U.S. at 285.
35. Id. at 286.
36. Id. at 287.
37. Id. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
38. 105 L.R.R.M. at 1173-74.

39. 93 CONG. REc. 6678, reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE- HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1595 (1947). See note 2, supra, for the text of the amendment to § 10(c).
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a dual motive discharge case. '0
The Board was avowedly attempting to reconcile the various tests prevalent in the circuit courts. Particularly important to the Board in this
attempt was the substantial deference that the Supreme Court had stated
was due the Board's decisions.' 1 Resolution of the conflict among the circuits is dependent not only upon the circuit courts' acceptance of the Mt.
Healthy test, but also upon a consistent construction and application of
the test throughout the circuits. Unfortunately, the Mt. Healthy test is
subject to varying interpretations. The Board perceived it as essentially
the same as the "in part" test coupled with a more equitable procedural
framework. 42 However, when the First Circuit adopted the Mt. Healthy
test in 1979, the court found it harmonious with the "dominant motive"
test,' s while the Second Circuit has applied it as a "but for" test."
In an attempt to convince the appellate courts of a single interpretation
of the Mt. Healthy test, the Board set forth the reasons for its construction of the test. The Board noted that Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.4 rejected the "dominant motive" test, 6 just as the "substantial part" test was rejected in Mt.
Healthy. The Board explained that it was abandoning the "in part" language as a means of "clearing the air" for the Mt. Healthy test to be
applied as formulated by the Supreme Court without incorporating into
7
that test the burdensome phraseology from past Board opinions.'
The Board's reliance on Arlington Heights to define the parameters of
the Mt. Healthy test was well placed. The two cases were decided on the
same day and the opinions were apparently written concurrently. Arlington Heights was an equal protection case concerning an alleged racially
discriminatory zoning ordinance. The Court noted that had the plaintiffs
carried their burden of proving that a discriminatory purpose was a "motivating factor" in the village's decision to enact the ordinance, the Mt.
Healthy burden-shifting procedure would have been applied. 48 In turn,
40. 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174, citing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34
(1967).
41. 105 L.R.R.M. at 1173, citing NLRB v. Truck Driver's Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957).
42. 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
43. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1979). Accord,
Texas Instr. Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 1067, 1073 (1st Cir. 1979); See also Keosaian, Inc. v.
NLRB, 630 F.2d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1980).
44. Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
46. Id. at 265.
47. See 105 L.R.R.M. at 1172, 1175 and cases cited therein.
48. 429 U.S. at 270 & n.21.
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49
the Court cited this language in enunciating the test in Mt. Healthy.
The Supreme Court has since referred to the test in other first amendment cases, 0 other equal protection cases 1 and in other areas of constitutional law, including due process52 and the sixth amendment.53 Perhaps
most notably, the Court has applied the test in the Title VII area.5 4 These
cases serve to define further the parameters of the test and indicate that
the Court views the test as appropriate for analyzing causation in varied
contexts. While the Court has refused to rule on the applicability of the
test to section 8(a)(3) dual motive discharge cases,"" its refusal is not necessarily a negative sign. On the contrary, the cumulative effect of the language in Mt. Healthy and Arlington Heights, the subsequent treatment
of the test by the Supreme Court and lower courts,56 the relevant dicta in
earlier Supreme Court opinions and the legislative history of the Act supports the conclusion that the Mt. Healthy test will 5 be
found to protect
7
organizational rights as well as constitutional rights.
The Board's adoption of the Mt. Healthy test in Wright Line was a

49. 429 U.S. at 287 n.2.
50. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n.6 (1980); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979), rev'g. Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309
(5th Cir. 1977).
51. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
465 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 n.54 (1978).
52. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260 (1978); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 630 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 (1979).
54. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 368 (1977). See also
East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 n.9 (1977).
55. The question was presented in the petition for certiorari following Leak Repairs, Inc.
v. NLRB, 622 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1980) enforcing 241 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 100 L.R.R.M. 1632
(Mar. 20, 1979). See 49 U.S.L.W. 3181 (Sept. 23, 1980). The Court denied certiorari. 49
U.S.L.W. 3249 (1980). In the petition for certiorari following Laredo Packing Co. v. NLRB,
625 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1980) enforcing 241 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 100 L.R.R.M. 1573 (Mar. 19,
1979) the issue presented was whether a "dominant motive" or "but for" test was appropriate. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3473 (Jan. 6, 1981). Again the Court denied certiorari. 49 U.S.L.W.
3486 (Jan. 13, 1981).
56. See, e.g., Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 122, 124-26 (5th Cir. 1980);
Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 611 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1979); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d
666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979); Zoll v. Eastern Allamakee Community School Dist., 588 F.2d 246,
251 (8th Cir. 1978); Downes v. Beach, 587 F.2d 469, 471 (10th Cir. 1978); Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98-101 (2d Cir. 1978); and United States v.
Winston, 558 F.2d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 1977).
57. See Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98-99 (2d Cir.
1978). See also NLRB v. Porta Systems Corp., 625 F.2d 399, 403-04 (2d Cir. 1980). For an
earlier promotion of the Mt. Healthy test, see DuRoss, Toward Rationality in-Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the
NLRA, 66 GEo. L.J. 1109 (1978).
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sound move toward the resolution of the "intolerable confusion in the
8(a)(3) area."" It is now up to the courts to abandon old tests and terminologies and to follow the Board's lead to accomplish the goal of enforcing the Act uniformly and fairly."
RAYMOND C. MAYER

58.

105 L.R.R.M. at 1174.

59. The First Circuit has set the example. The court expressly approved of the Wright
Line decision in Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 106 L.R.R.M. 2799, 2801-02 (1st Cir. 1981).

